

BEYOND THE DISCIPLINES, GOD

The Study of the Christian Scriptures and
the Formation of a Faithful Habitus for
Truthful Learning

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The current general education curriculum of the American university hovers between its encyclopedic origins and its genealogical negation.¹ As encyclopedic, we offer classes, particularly classes in the natural sciences, where students learn “a single framework within which knowledge is discriminated from mere belief, progress towards knowledge is mapped, and truth is understood as the relationship of *our* knowledge to *the* world, through the application of those methods whose rules are the rules of rationality as such.”² Students discover a pragmatic unity to the curriculum, spelled out in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by the American psychologist/philosopher William James. According to the Jamesian image, the university offers the student various scientific disciplinary rooms within an educational hotel.³ A hallway connects the rooms through doorways, i.e., rationality as such. Students may enter rooms to sample various domains of study selectively, perhaps in order to choose one for lifelong professional or recreational consumption; more likely they rush through to get the visit “out of the way.”

As genealogical, we require students to leave the hallway to enter other disciplinary rooms, particularly the social sciences and the humanities. Students enter these disciplines through previously unseen apertures in order to undo a unitary concept of reason. In these rooms, students learn that there is "a multiplicity of perspectives within each of which truth-from-a-point-of-view may be asserted, but no truth-as-such, an empty notion, about *the* world, an equally empty notion. There are no rules of rationality as such to be appealed to, there are rather strategies of insight and strategies of subversion."⁴ These rooms form socially engaged rationalities. Here students learn to make a difference in the world, to provide a voice for the voiceless, and to empower those oppressed by the dominant hegemonic powers. In these rooms students learn the moral and political superiority of resistance over hegemony. Students become strategic, activist intellectuals to unsettle the settled, to denaturalize the natural, to learn to engage in authentic and meaningful activities either professionally as an activist or as a volunteer within the civil society of their choice.

In such a curriculum bifurcated between nature and culture, students learn most of all that there is a hallway, a respite outside the conflict of the faculty. The hallway stands beyond the gaze of professors, monitored by the coercive discipline of the local university administration and the state. The marketplace governs this realm to provide entertainment, fun, and a lever to release pressure from the stress of the classroom. From the students' perspective, it seems a realm of peace. No conflict is visibly manifest as market-formed demographic niches lead students into parallel passages in the market-formed width of the hallway. When conflicts do emerge, the administration and/or state moves quickly to expunge its evidence from historical consciousness to restore the university's and state's desired image as the arbitrators of peace.

The general education curricular structure mirrors the larger institutional conflict within the contemporary university faculty. Particular academic disciplines exist through the force of the encyclopedic tradition. Students learn, as their faculty before them, to control and dominate nature, to manage and produce for profit within the neo-liberal marketplace. Cultural studies and related modes of thought exist

parasitically upon this work of productivity. The faculty of resistance legitimate themselves through the criticism of the neo-liberal forces that reduce knowledge to productivity, masking the deep interests already embedded in the categories of the knowledge produced. The university provides the field of dreams upon which the faculty and students participate in the agonistic dialectic of hegemony and resistance. The university *qua* university transforms the struggle into the creative production of history. The university forms students to “make a difference” as intentional players within the production of history. Students learn to manage the conflict between hegemony and resistance with technical competence, to express their own will in order to judge when to dominate and when to resist. Most of all, they learn to escape into the hallway of relationships (or hooking up) to consume material or cultural goods or each other; such a realm is ultimately much more fun than struggle.

How does one place the study of God, theology, in such a setting? The question disrupts. Is it a matter of hegemony or resistance? Knowledge or faith? Learning or values clarification? A single room or the hallway? The fact that the question disrupts shows how deeply the modern/postmodern university has formed us. Perhaps we might turn to a foundational text of the contemporary university—Immanuel Kant’s *The Conflict of the Faculties*—in order to understand better the tacit knowledge that shapes our daily work and life.

Kant, the University, and the Discipline of the State

Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century Prussian Enlightenment philosopher, is famous for his three philosophical critiques—*The Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and *The Critique of Judgment*—and his important essay, “What Is Enlightenment?” Nonetheless, as Thomas Howard has noted, another of Kant’s essays, “The Conflict of the Faculties,”

is a work of rich significance. Not only does it shed light on Kant’s personal religious views, but the work also effectively summed up, while adding trenchant commentary to, the growing concern many had about the division of the faculties. What is more, the work influenced many future directions of German

university development: practically every major figure involved in the founding of the University of Berlin would have known its contents and the circumstances of its writing quite well.⁵

Kant's essay provides a genealogical foundation for the transformation of universities that occurred in the United States during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The deepest presupposition of Kant's essay is the universality of the state. As Jacques Derrida rightly notes, for Kant the university

is not authorized by itself. It is authorized (*berechtigt*) by a non-university agency—here, by the state—and according to criteria no longer necessarily or finally those of scientific competence, but those of a certain performativity. The autonomy of scientific evaluation may be absolute and unconditioned, but the political effects of its legitimation, even supposing that one could in all rigor distinguish them, are nonetheless controlled, measured, and overseen by a power outside the university.⁶

The state grounds the university as the condition for its existence.

The higher faculty, the faculty of theology, law, and medicine, operate directly under the state to provide an educated class to manage its populace: "the following order exists among the incentives that the government can use to achieve its end (of influencing the people)."⁷ Even though Kant emphasizes the absolute autonomy of the "lower faculty" from state interference, this faculty still exists for the state. As the "lower" philosophy faculty pursues its disinterested, rational research, the higher faculty mediates the lower faculty's findings to the state bureaucracy:

The result of the freedom, which the philosophy faculty must enjoy unimpaired, is that the higher faculties (themselves better instructed) will lead these officials more and more onto the way of truth. And the officials, of their own part, also more enlightened about their duty, will not be repelled at changing their exposition, since the new way involves nothing more than a clearer insight into means for achieving the same end.⁸

The state provides the end, the *telos*, of the university. The state is the university's Alpha and Omega, its beginning and end, the context in which the university lives and moves and has its being. For Kant, the university performs for the state as the state calls it into existence.

As part of the higher faculty, the theology faculty, what Kant calls "biblical theologians," serves the state both directly and indirectly. Directly, the Bible possesses a utilitarian worth to aid the state's domination of its population:

. . . the Bible deserves to be kept, put to moral use, and assigned to religion as its guide *just as if it is a divine revelation*.

If the government were to neglect that great means for establishing and administering civil order and peace and abandon it to frivolous hands, the audacity of those prodigies of strength who imagine they have already outgrown this leading-string of dogma . . . would soon make it [the state] regret its indulgence.⁹

Kant's vision is not merely a Constantinian modernity where theology works to legitimate the morality of the nation-state; it is what Thomas Howard calls an "Erastian modernity": "a process whereby the churches were virtually annexed to the modernizing state and subjected to major government oversight and regulation."¹⁰ The theology faculty's direct subordination to the state was their price of admission into Kant's university.

Indirectly, the theology faculty serves the state by mediating conflict between the state and the lower faculty. While the theology faculty may not criticize the work of the philosophy faculty, the philosophy faculty disciplines the theology faculty according to the "critique of reason."¹¹ The theology faculty must re-state its teachings in light of reason, the work of the lower faculty: "when conflict arises about the sense of a scriptural text, philosophy—that is, the lower faculty, which has truth as its end—claims the prerogative of deciding its meaning."¹² For instance, as "the only thing that matters in religion is *deeds*, and this final aim, accordingly, a meaning appropriate to it, must be attributed to every biblical dogma."¹³ Therefore, "ecclesiastical faith, as the mere vehicle of religious faith, is mutable and must remain open to gradual purification

until it coincides with religious faith."¹⁴ The study of the Bible within the university necessarily involves a task of correlation, constantly adjusting the ecclesial faith to bring it into line with universal reason and morality. Then the theology faculty may transmit it to state officials who shape the populace to bring about "peace and harmony" for the state. Reason, seen in the bodies of the philosophy faculty, must discipline theology, seen in the bodies of the theology faculty, for the good of the state. Kant's university and its disciplines regulate, control, and neutralize the theology faculty through state authority and philosophical, scientific reason. Theology possesses no authority of its own; it exists for mediation in terms provided by other disciplines.

The Habitus of the Discipline of the Conflict of Faculties

It is tempting to read Kant's essay like Jacques Derrida: "Reading him today, I perceive his assurance and his necessity much as one might admire the rigor of a plan or structure through the breaches of an uninhabitable edifice, unable to decide whether it is in ruins or simply never existed, having only ever been able to shelter the discourse of its non-accomplishment."¹⁵ Kant's confidence in pure reason and a paternalistic, benevolent state makes his vision sound as archaic as the alchemist's lab.

Yet it is not difficult to find ourselves within the Kantian tradition of the university, even at a private Christian university. The tendency to focus general education theology classes as descriptive classes on "the Bible" *per se* reflects the enduring Kantian legacy. The Christian university's curricular and extra-curricular concern with biblical morality, whether to teach the students "personal righteousness" or "social justice," already reflects the Kantian categories that abstract the Scriptures from its proper locus in the church. The sense among Christian university faculty that the university needs to mediate the "objective knowledge" drawn from their own disciplines in order to deepen the church's effectiveness repeats the same Kantian legacy. Departments of Religion (the Kantian term for the universal human phenomenon of which theology is a particular instance) still face pressure to translate Christian doctrine into a philosophical language already intelligible to the culture for their students. The list could go on. Yet I would like to argue that the modern/

postmodern university more deeply complicates our task by forming disciplinary habits, or more precisely, a habitus, that render problematic the teaching of theology for our students' general education.

Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist, re-habilitates the medieval concept of habitus in his *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. The concept allows Bourdieu to show how social "structures" become repeated and encoded in human bodies and behavior without reifying such structures. For Bourdieu, a habitus is

systems of durable, transposable *dispositions*, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.¹⁶

More simply put, a habitus is "the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations" or even more simply, "history turned into nature."¹⁷ Through the concept of habitus, Bourdieu allows us to overcome the subjectivist/objectivist dichotomy of human agency in order to "establish an experimental science of the *dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality*."¹⁸ Within a university setting, we might describe the habitus as the outcome of the disciplinary structures that generate a student's general education—the fundamental shaping, not of particular curricular choices or information, but the conditions that make such curricular choices possible.

Students receive their habitus, their general education, within the disciplinary structures of the modern university with its Kantian legacy. First, students learn the rules of managing conflict for and under the authority of the state. The Kantian university confines the conflict of the faculties to a designated space within the university so as not to disturb the state in its hegemony over its people, even as the university actively serves the state. Derrida argues that Kant's university is "as much a

safeguard for the most totalitarian of social forms as a place for the most intransigently liberal resistance to any abuse of power, resistance that can be judged in turns as most rigorous or most impotent."¹⁹ In either case, the state is the reality that one must support or oppose. The university forms a habitus in students that presupposes that the state is the chief political actor and authorizer of human goods. The university's discipline makes such a history nature for general education: responsibility in strategic relations within and for the state becomes the most fundamental habitus of the university.

The Kantian structures form students into an even more differentiated habitus. The university reinforces the liberal democratic distinction between the public and the private realms, which are "two quite separate conceptual realms: one in which unquestioned obedience to authority prevails (the juridical definitions upheld by the state); the other consisting of rational argument and exchange, in which authority has no place (the omnicompetence of criticism)."²⁰ Through their transformation within late capitalism, we find these realms encoded into the university as what Robert Bellah calls the two realms of American culture, the managerial and the therapeutic.²¹ Bellah himself developed these categories from Alasdair MacIntyre's explication of the role of the manager and the therapist:

The manager represents in his character the obliteration of the distinction between manipulative and nonmanipulative social relations; the therapist represents the same obliteration in the sphere of personal life. The manager treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is with technique, with effectiveness in transforming raw materials into final products, unskilled labor into skilled labor, investments into profits. The therapist also treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern also is with technique, with effectiveness in transforming neurotic symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones.²²

These realms become encoded in the university in the distinction between the "rooms" and the "hallway" of the university. Rooms are governed by a judicial reason overseen by the faculty—students must

learn "what the professor wants"; the free rationality of consumerism, the ability to choose what one desires, governs the hallway.

The university forms its students into these realms through a menu approach to general education. Students are habituated into moving in and through authoritative rationalities in their various classrooms where they alternate between hegemonic and resistant judicial reason. The classroom forms students into a habitus of negotiation, "a politics of the negotiating party, with every work negotiating even as it states a premise or a theory."²³ Such a formation prepares students to enter the "system of professions" that await most upon their terminal academic degree.²⁴

More significantly, however, students distinguish this judicial rationality from the more "universal" realm of the free rationality of the consumer. The hallway provides the ability, the "freedom," to choose their own values and meaning outside the realm of judicial reason. Combined, such networks form a habitus to prepare the students to enter the negotiated realms of the professions, while balancing this realm with the private realm of personal meaning and therapeutic activities such as family and church.

These forces are not unique to the university; they form the basic disciplinary fabric of life within a liberal-democratic polity. Students enter the university with this habitus already ingrained within their bodies. The general education of the university deepens the internalization and permanence of such a habitus. The university formation often occurs simultaneously as young adults undergo a social redefinition in movement away from the local, concrete commitments to the abstract commitments necessary to sustain a liberal society.²⁵ This habitus, however, makes theology, the knowledge of God, fundamentally problematic in general education for the students. Instead of language about God and all things related to God, theology becomes the realm of "personal values."

First, the habitus inculcated by the contemporary university structures education with the state as its beginning and end. God, at best, becomes an interesting "hypothesis" within the given realm of existence, unnecessary to the workings of the society and world, and therefore, outside the realm of knowledge. Faith becomes separate from knowledge; revelation contrary to rationality rather than its basis; the good

becomes "values." Ironically, the nation-state becomes more basic in defining life than God.

Theology has a name for such a habitus: it's called idolatry. Christians, along with Jews and Muslims, have generally understood idolatry as irrational. Idolatry stands as a (in)substantial obstacle to the study of God as part of students' general education.

Second, and relatedly, the habitus formed in students presupposes that the state is the most significant political actor in the world rather than the church. Human activities are weighed in relationship to their impact within the state rather than constancy of witness within the church. To "make a difference in the world" requires the virtues of the politics of the state such as responsibility, efficiency, compromise, control, and toleration rather than the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love. Involvement in local congregations becomes voluntary and largely irrelevant except for private enrichment or communal social activism. The university habituates students into a system that sees the state, not the church, as significant for human life and activity.

Such a habitus renders theology unintelligible. Theology quickly becomes vacuous when abstracted from the practices that its language supports. Jesus did not institute the liberal nation-state on the night when he was betrayed, but the church, through giving his disciples bread and the cup, his body and blood. Theology presupposes the life of the church catholic, the communion of saints through the ages. It is the language of this particular people that God has called into existence through the life of the Jews and especially the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Before theology can even become intelligible as a discourse of knowledge, the students need to be re-formed from the implicit Erastian commitments of the modern university. Knowledge of God requires participation by faith within the church, for theological knowledge always has its beginning and end in Love, the Love that is the Triune God that is revealed to us from the Father in Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit.

Third, the habitus formed by the structures of the university compartmentalizes theology into specific categories that profoundly distort its discourse. Placed into the private realm of the therapeutic, theology becomes, as Christian Smith has shown, a discourse of moralistic

therapeutic deism, or better, of a moralistic therapeutic relational deity—"a divine butler and cosmic therapist."²⁶ Theology becomes about significance rather than truth, human experience rather than God. Moreover, the one-class-one-subject-one-grade structure habituates students to expect that theology is about a particular subject or object in the world. The university structures themselves tend to reduce God to an Object among objects or a Being among beings. Such structures distort language about God, itself a very tricky matter. While theology is knowledge of God and all things in relationship to God, we know God only as One Unknown, as Thomas Aquinas reminds us. We know God through God's effects, that is, through creation, particularly the human, Jesus Christ, and then all things through Him. Language about God does not refer to a subject to be mastered or an object to be analyzed and controlled; language about God requires a particular use of language that implicates all language. It is ultimately the language of prayer and praise. God implodes the categories of the managerial and therapeutic and exceeds any language of subject or object. The compartmentalizing habitus of students, formed by the university, restricts the ability to include theology into a general education curriculum without severe problems.

Finally, the categorization of theology as a distinct academic subject places theology within the same mediating role as endorsed by Kant. The habitus of the modern university seeks to relate theology as a discreet field of inquiry to parallel discreet fields of inquiry, particularly in upper-division, capstone-type classes. It raises questions like, "How does faith relate to science?" rather than how do we speak well of the relationship of God to creation as seen in Jesus Christ and witnessed to in Scriptures? Theological discourse becomes governed by the supposed rationally-determined givenness of other academic disciplines. Correlation between "two originally distinct spheres of knowledge" becomes the goal. Within the habitus formed by the contemporary university, classes on "theology and psychology," "theological and business ethics," "theology and science," and "theology and literature" achieve a coherence based upon a mediating function of theology that would never occur in classical Christian thought. Such classes have an apologetic intent, a way to make "God" relevant to students' lives and

the world. As Karl Barth has taught us, however, another disciplinary “prolegomena” to which theology then relates already bears within it theological and philosophical commitments that render theological discourse problematic.²⁷ It replaces God’s revelation in Jesus Christ with categories that are seen as “natural” or already given.

If this is so, the habitus formed by the contemporary university renders theology as a disciplinary part of a university deeply problematic. Such a university already exists under the discipline of a foundation by the state that distorts the very possibility of theological discourse. As the logic of this works its way to its end, the problem of its foundation has become readily apparent in terms of the incoherence, irrelevance, and ironically, the irrationality of the contemporary university. Perhaps Jacques Derrida is correct: “If there can be no pure concept of the university, if, within the university, there can be no pure or purely rational concept of the university, this—to speak somewhat elliptically. . . is due very simply to the fact that the university is *founded*. An event of foundation can never be comprehended merely within the logic that it founds.”²⁸ Kant’s foundation on pure rationality through the power of the modern state has failed.

Yet this failure opens up future possibilities. If, as David Burrell has suggested, the modern was the post-medieval, then we might understand the post-modern as the post-post-medieval.²⁹ Perhaps by returning to the medieval origins of the university we might re-discover a habitus that renders theology intelligible as a rational discourse that forms human beings to know God—and therefore the world—truthfully. Perhaps we need a general education, the formation of truthful habitus, to enable our students—and faculty—to read Scriptures as witnesses to the revelation of the triune God in whom and through whom and for whom we—and all creation—live and move and have our being.

Beyond the Disciplines, God

How does one get beyond the disciplines of the modern university to recover a habitus sufficient for theological discourse? As John Milbank has suggested, timidity will not do:

theology, in the face of secular attack, is only on secure ground if it adopts the most extreme mode of counterattack: namely

that unless other disciplines are (at least implicitly) ordered to theology (assuming that this means participation in God's self-knowledge—as in the Augustinian tradition) they are objectively and demonstrably null and void, altogether lacking in truth, which to have any meaning must involve some sort of adequation (for mere "coherence" can only concern the coherence of conventions or appearances).³⁰

We need, as Derrida suggests, to return to a new foundation, a foundation before/after the disciplinary function of "pure reason."

Perhaps we may find such a foundation in the origins of the Western university. According to Stephen Ferruolo, the Western university emerged as twelfth-century school masters incorporated monastic and moralistic criticism of fragmentation, pride, and ambition into an educational ideal that organized all knowledge into a unity.³¹ By incorporating the monastic end of learning in the knowledge of God as fundamental to its intellectual endeavor, the university arose to form an educated habitus in its students that found its beginning and end in the love of God. It is this founding that we might repeat.

Merely cosmetic changes will not do. We must rethink the habitus of our institutions, their histories that we now accept as nature. To accomplish a medieval non-identical repetition amid our current Kantian non-identical repetition will take re-thinking our institutions and general education in light of this new/old founding. We must shift an educational habitus for faculty, administrators, and students from the cultural given in which we live to one rendering theology possible without falling into the dialectic of hegemony and resistance. It seems to me that the key to such a transition is readily available to Christian colleges and universities if we could only maximize the inherent logic of such an institution's practices. My suggestion is simply that the whole of the university's intellectual and social life culminate in the proper worship of the Triune God in chapel.³² If students might be taught the proper craft of Christian worship, then the Spirit may bring forth the appropriate habitus, or general education, to form them to become faithful learners in seeing the world truthfully as the creation of the eternally Triune God. The institution could unite to develop students' participation in Christian worship rather than accommodating Christian worship to

meet student development as defined by the liberal democratic habitus. Three steps seem mandatory.

First, the general education classroom should develop a cultural studies perspective on historic and contemporary Western university and culture as part of their “first-year” experience. If students have had their habitus formed by a toxic culture which sees war as natural and peace as unrealistic, which has taught them that university life is a means of economic exchange for fun and profit, they need to bring to consciousness, as much as possible, the tacit knowledge and underlying cultural narratives that the students, faculty, and administration have brought into the university. The students need to come to terms with the modernist co-optation of the Christian founding of the university and discover its original founding event in the love of learning as the desire for God revealed in Jesus.³³

Having recognized their ignorance and malformation, the students need positive examples of excellence in the craft of worship—much like writing professors’ assignments for the students to read excellent writing exemplars. The students need to encounter stories of experts in Christian worship, that is, the lives of the saints, those whose lives become intelligible only in light of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. Perhaps like labs in biology, students could be formed bit by bit with the skills, observations, and language necessary to participate in Christian worship. Through slow habituation of practice and the gaining of a language, students can form a habitus that expects worship to find its end in participation in the gospel through the proclamation of the Scriptures and participation in the Eucharist. Because of their malformed habitus upon arrival into the university, first-year students should receive instruction into the history and practices of the university chapel—and particularly the skills and dispositions that the expert participants in the practices need to develop. Universities regularly require prerequisites that are necessary to engage in advanced activities; Calculus II always requires the proficiency achieved by the students in Calculus I.

As part of this formation, participation in faithful local congregations, the body of Christ, under the sacramental authority of local pastors, could be explained as essential, much like membership in a choir is necessary for the first-year vocalist as she develops her craft. The local

congregation, not the university, is the means by which God has elected to witness to God's own self in the world. Of course, this presupposes that the students will find the faculty, the masters, deeply embedded, faithful, and obedient in congregations in and around the university to aid them in the movement back and forth from the university chapel to the local congregation. The particular tradition of the Christian university stands in a complicated relationship to the society that surrounds it. Through allowing students to gain awareness of their placement within the university, it could provide an initial habitus to participate in the university's worship, much as early Christianity required an extended catechumenate before baptism and admittance of the believer into the fullness of the Christian rites.³⁴

Second, the university must return the primary locus of theological discourse to its proper place: the worship of the church. In chapel, the university becomes visibly manifest as the church. Here the intellectual life of the university must reach its highest level of discourse in order to show the unity of all discourse in the Triune God, a unity that always exceeds the discourse itself. As the center of the rational life of the university, the Vice President of Academic Affairs should have ultimate responsibility for chapel in close collaboration with the President. Because students in their general education will have begun to understand the difference between entertainment and truthful homiletic discourses and between therapeutic developmental psychological advice for late adolescents and proper Christian language, the university will free the chaplain to encode the students' lives into the Scriptural narrative rather than seek to make the Scriptures relevant to them.³⁵ Chapel sermons can provide deeper probing in the difference between the Christian life as a thankful pilgrimage through this world from God to God as a member of Christ's body and a life lived for this age as a member of a liberal democratic society. Chapel can constantly explore the strategies and tactics necessary to share in the world's goods without assimilating into its practices and malformation. Chapel should be the primary location where students learn the Christian craft of plundering the Egyptians.³⁶

Scriptural readings shared in common with the church catholic should form the basis of the regular Ministry of the Word that

constitutes chapel. The chapel discourse should be structured so as to render intelligible a weekly practice of the Eucharist in which the university is made the church visible to the world through Christ's body and blood, one Body, students, faculty, administration, and staff alike. Chapel should be structured to form the student deeper and deeper into the language of prayer and praise appropriate to the university.

As students approach graduation, special sessions need to be held to explain the difference between the discourse of a university chapel and that of a local congregation. Students, with deeper formation than those without the gift of a habitus from the Christian university, will need to be warned concerning the perils of spiritual pride. Young, energetic, and impulsive, they will need to be instructed in the need for patience and the importance of unity, constancy, and peace for local congregations in order to enhance the witness of the church amid a culture that would make worship a commodity on the local board of ecclesial trade. In this way, the university can sustain a constituency within local churches over time even as the local churches become equipped to sustain a Christian university that seeks to form its students through a Christian habitus.

Third, once encountering the Christian Scriptures in their native environment of the gathering of the church in worship, "general education" Scripture classes can provide instruction in the Scriptural text through exploring the grammar of participation in God's own self-knowledge from Scripture. As already encountered in worship, the professor can explicate the underlying doctrines of Christian revelation in Jesus Christ and the Scriptures' role as a witness to the revelation of God in Jesus—the Christological and ecclesiological end of Scripture. The class should explore the narrative structure of Scripture as it finds its climax in Jesus Christ and the life of the church.

As the texts are creation, not God, the professor can examine the historical formation of the texts as the means of God's providential sanctifying of these texts in accordance with the gospel witness that "salvation comes from the Jews."³⁷ One class should cover the whole Scriptures, rather than separate classes for the Old Testament or New Testament. Scholars must suspend disciplinary specializations within the Society of Biblical Literature or the American Academy of Religion to study the proper social and political context of this literature in the

worship and life of the church through the ages. In this way, the general education curriculum can dissolve the artificial theological divisions between theology and biblical studies and church history. They all provide momentary glimpses into the greater life of the worship and prayer of the church.

Throughout the class, students must discover that faith and reason are not two distinct qualities, but represent a continuum within rationality.³⁸ As faith gives rise to reason, so reason raises and purifies faith to show its true nature as reason in its culmination in the *Logos*, Jesus Christ, the crucified and risen Lord of all creation, the same *Logos* testified to in the Scriptures.³⁹ The historical conditions of the production of the text do not annul or confirm their status as Scripture; rather the students can grasp how these texts are taken up and made to be what they truly are when placed into the narrative relations provided by the Rule of Faith within the worship of the church as a witness to the Triune God. The professor must displace a Kantian framework that posits a realm of "pure reason" against faith and revelation, and concepts of faith and revelation that stand outside of reason. Faith does not annul reason, but provides the necessary conditions to see the Scriptural texts for what they really were by what they have become. The class must give a language to what the students have already experienced in chapel, an experience already enriched after their first year General Education class on the university and chapel. The students will have had opportunity to receive a language to accompany the habitus that renders theology—the knowledge of the Triune God as One Unknown—a rational discourse that, in turn, renders intelligible the world in which they live.

By centering the university's general education upon chapel, the university is free to engage in faithful learning, to discover, for instance, that the sciences do not study nature *per se*, but creation. As creation, God has created that which is other than God's own Being from God's own Being. Thus, creation is both contingent—it has a history—and has been gifted with its own existence with a proper autonomy in and of itself. Thus, theology does not dictate what the biologist discovers in the lab, though it surely may have much to say about what questions are asked, to what end the technology is applied, and from whom the biologist accepts funding.

Placing the worship of God as central in the university also frees faculty to rethink the disciplines, to teach the disciplines shaped by the habitus of the Kantian university, but to teach them not as natural, but as part of rival collectives and thus to maximize the benefit and limit the harm that they can do. The faculty must provide wisdom so as to open the students up to creative tactics to live life in the world as members of local congregations rather than as professionals who have careers. The faculty must help their students avoid falling into idolatry later in life. Faculty and students alike will find the imaginary lines of disciplines dissolving as courses bleed into each other, such as philosophy, literature, theology, and art. Business classes can be taught where profit is a good, but a good in which economic exchanges serve humans rather than humans serving economic exchanges. Management classes become sites, not to produce higher rates of laborer efficiency per se, but to help management efficiency serve the laborer so that the laborer can use the material goods of this world for the glory and worship of God. A unity of teaching and research come together in the ordering of the goods of the human intellect as we find our beginning and end in the God who created us, called forth Israel amid the nations, redeemed us in Jesus Christ, and called us into the church as we await the eschatological renewal of all things in Christ.

A Faithful Habitus for Truthful Learning within the University

Returning to the origins of the university in the monastic transformation of the medieval schools through re-centering the university around worship allows us to have formed in us and our students a habitus of Wisdom, a means of ordering goods in light of the Good that is God amid a world that would pull us into an agonistic struggle between hegemony and resistance. It will take the faithfulness of the martyrs, witnesses who did not lose confidence in the face of receiving the full brunt of violence for refusing to play by the faith, the allegiances of the society around them.⁴⁰

Perhaps the deep struggles in the life of the universities around us should give us strength, even as we work outside these corridors of wealth, power, and influence. It is generally agreed that such universities

in the United States have lost intelligibility as institutions other than providing a means of economic exchanges, student credentialing for recognition and financial wealth, and professorial questing for professional status. Without theology, its founding discourse and the life of the church to sustain it, it is not apparent that the university can sustain a coherent life and continue its drift into irrelevancy. It may be, as Stanley Hauerwas has recently argued, that the university needs theology to be saved from the arbitrary, irrational powers of the marketplace.⁴¹

Such struggles within the contemporary university with its Kantian genealogy should not surprise us. The formation of the habitus necessary to sustain theological discourse was a foundation of the Western university, and may provide a *sine qua non* of its existence over time. We must remember our history:

the university originated, not out of acquiescence to the demands for more specialized and practical learning, but out of resistance to these pressures. The university was a victory, if never a complete one, for a higher educational ideal. The examination of how this important victory was achieved might help to answer the questions of why the university has survived for so long and what are the most serious threats to its future.⁴²

The formation of a habitus necessary to sustain theological discourse seems to lie at the center of this victory. If so, its recovery in institutions could provide a gift to sustain such a discourse until other universities find it or are radically transformed by different social and economic conditions into a vestige of a new type of institution that leaves the university behind. Our deepest relevance may lie in our patience, in our willingness to be utterly irrelevant in our main task of forming a habitus of worship in our students—and allowing the Holy Spirit to bring forth one in us—that renders theology intelligible as a discourse of knowledge.

Chapter 8 Notes

1. The categories of "encyclopaedia" and "genealogy" are taken from Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). Bruno Latour speaks of the same configuration in his analysis of "the modern constitution" in *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 13-48.
2. MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions*, 42.
3. See William James, *Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1922), 54-55.
4. MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions*, 42.
5. Thomas Albert Howard, *Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 123.
6. Jacques Derrida, "Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties" in *Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties*, ed. Richard Rand (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 6.
7. Immanuel Kant, "The Conflict of the Faculties," in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 250.
8. Kant, "The Conflict of the Faculty," 256.
9. *Ibid.*, 285.
10. Howard, *Protestant Theology*, 22.
11. Kant, "The Conflict of the Faculty," 287.
12. *Ibid.*, 264.
13. *Ibid.*, 267.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Derrida, "Mochlos," 11-12.
16. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 72.
17. *Ibid.*, 78.
18. *Ibid.*, 72.
19. Derrida, "Mochlos," 18.
20. Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 204.
21. See Robert Bellah, et al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 46-51.
22. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 30.
23. Such is the description of Derrida's politics in Richard Rand, "Preface" in *Logomachia*, ix.
24. See Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
25. One finds here the network that has constructed the new "developmental stage" of "emerging adulthood." See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, *Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from the Late Teens Through the Twenties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

26. See Christian Smith and Melina Lundquist Denton, *Soul Searching: The Religious Lives of American Teenagers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162-71, especially 165.
27. See Karl Barth, "The Task of Prolegomena to Dogmatics," *Church Dogmatics 1.1: The Doctrine of the Word of God* (trans. G. T. Thomson; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), 26-47.
28. Derrida, "Mochlos," 29-30.
29. See David M. Burrell "Religion and the University," *CrossCurrents* (Summer 2006), www.crosscurrents.org/burrellsummer2006.pdf.
30. John Milbank, "The Conflict of the Faculties: Theology and the Economy of the Sciences," in *Faithfulness and Fortitude: Conversations with the Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas*, ed. Mark Nation and Samuel Wells (London: T & T Clark, 2000), 45.
31. See Stephen Ferruolo, *The Origins of University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100-1215* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985).
32. For similar proposals, see Gavin D'Costa, "Why Theologians Must Pray for Release from Exile," in *Theology in the Public Square: Church, Academy and Nation*, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 112-44, and James K. A. Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation*, Cultural Liturgies, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009).
33. See Jean LeClercq, OSB, *The Love of Learning and Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). See also Mark A. Noll, *Jesus Christ and the Life of the Mind* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).
34. See Edward Yarnold, SJ, *The Awe-Inspiring Rites of Initiation: The Origins of the R.C.I.A.*, 2nd edition (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994). See also Paul F. Bradshaw, Maxwell E. Johnson, and L. Edward Phillips, *The Apostolic Tradition*, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 82-151.
35. See John W. Wright, *Telling God's Story: Narrative Preaching for Christian Formation* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007).
36. See Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis. Vol. 1: The Four Senses of Scripture*, trans. Mark Sebanc; Ressourcement: Retrieval and Renewal in Catholic Thought (Grand Rapid, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 211-24.
37. See John Webster, *Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch*, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
38. See the excellent collection in Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter, eds., *Reasons and the Reasons of Faith*, Theology for the Twenty-First Century (New York: T & T. Clark, 2005); Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons, eds., *Restoring Faith in Reason: A New Translation of the Encyclical Faith and Reason of Pope John Paul II, Together with a Commentary and Discussion*, Faith in Reason (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); and Conor Cunningham and Peter Candler, eds., *The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition, and Universalism*, Veritas Series (London: SCM Press, 2009).
39. See David L. Schindler, "Introduction: Grace and the Form of Nature and Culture" in *Catholicism and Secularization in America: Essays on Nature, Grace, and Culture*, ed. David L. Schindler (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 1990), 10-30.

40. See Michael L. Budde and Karen Scott, eds., *Witness of the Body: The Past, Present, and Future of Christian Martyrdom* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).

41. Stanley Hauerwas, "The Pathos of the University: The Case of Stanley Fish," in *The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God, Illuminations: Theory and Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 76-91.

42. Ferruolo, *The Origins of University*, 7-8.

BEYOND INTEGRATION?

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Copyright 2012 by ACU Press

ISBN 978-0-89112-317-0

LCCN 2012002324

Printed in the United States of America

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Beyond integration : inter/disciplinary possibilities for the future of Christian higher education / Todd C. Ream, Jerry Pattengale, and David L. Riggs, editors ; foreword by John Wilson.

p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 978-0-89112-317-0

1. Christian universities and colleges--United States. 2. Christian education--United States. 3. Interdisciplinary approach in education--United States. I. Ream, Todd C. II. Pattengale, Jerry A. III. Riggs, David L. (David Lee), 1967-

LC427.B49 2012

378:071--dc23

2012002324

Cover design by Rick Gibson

Interior text design by Sandy Armstrong

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For information contact:

Abilene Christian University Press

1626 Campus Court

Abilene, Texas 79601

1-877-816-4455

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